Delhi Judicial Service Examination Passage-based Questions Previous Year Questions
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Question 1
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
According to the author, misreasoning is:
Question 2
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
A 'First Principle' is:
Question 3
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Which form of reasoning draws from neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted?
Question 4
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
How many forms of contentious reasoning are mentioned by the author?
Question 5
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Arguments that are derived from premises that are believed to be true on their own strength are:
Question 6
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Which one of the following is not a synonym of 'fallacy'?
Question 7
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Which one of the following is not an antonym of 'illustrious'?
Question 8
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Which of the following statements is correct?
Question 9
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
Reasoning is an argument in which certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true. Reasoning on the other hand is dialectical, if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are 'true' and 'primary' which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted" which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers, that is, by all or by the majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again reasoning is contentious if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally accepted is the illusion entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments; for the nature of the fallacy in these is obvious immediately, and as a rule even to persons with little power of comprehension. So then, of the contentious reasonings mentioned, the former really deserves to be called "reasoning" as well, but the other should be called "contentious reasoning", but not reasoning since it appears to reason, but does not really do so. Further, besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences, as happens (for example) in the case of geometry and her sister sciences. For this form of reasoning appears to differ from the reasonings mentioned above; the man who draws a false figure reasons from things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally accepted. For he does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either by everyone, or by the majority, or the philosophers - that is to say, by all, or by most, or by the most illustrious of them. But he conducts his reasoning upon assumptions, which though appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects his misreasoning either by describing the semicircles wrongly, or by drawing certain lines in a way in which they could not be drawn.
Contentious means:
Question 10
Read the following passage carefully and choose the best answer.
One major obstacle in the struggle to lower carbon dioxide emissions, which are believed to play a role in climate change, is the destruction of tropical rain forests. Trees naturally store more carbon dioxide as they age, and the trees of the tropical rain forests in the Amazon, for example, store an average of 500 tons of carbon dioxide per hectare (10,000 square metres). When such trees are harvested, they release their carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. This release of carbon dioxide through the destruction of tropical forests, which experts estimate accounts for 20% of global carbon dioxide emissions annually, traps heat in the earth's atmosphere, which leads to global warming. The Kyoto treaty set forth a possible measure to curtail the rate of deforestation. In the treaty, companies that exceed their carbon dioxide emission limits are permitted to buy the right to pollute by funding reforestation projects in tropical rain forests. Since forests absorb carbon dioxide through photosynthesis, planting such forests helps reduce the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide, thus balancing out the companies' surplus of carbon dioxide emissions. However, attempts at reforestation have so far been unable to keep up with the alarming rate of deforestation, and it has become increasingly clear that further steps must be taken to curtail deforestation and its possible deleterious effects on the global environment. One possible solution is to offer incentives to governments to protect their forests. While this solution could lead to a drastic reduction in the levels of carbon dioxide, such incentives would need to be tied to some form of verification, which is extremely difficult, since most of the world's tropical forests are in remote areas, like Brazil's Amazon basin or the island of New Guinea, which makes on-site verification logistically difficult. Furthermore, heavy cloud cover and frequent heavy rain make conventional satellite monitoring difficult. Recently, scientists at the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency have suggested that the rates of deforestation could be monitored using new technology to analyze radar waves emitted from a surveillance satellite. By analyzing multiple radar microwaves sent by a satellite, scientists are able to prepare a detailed, high-resolution map of remote tropical forests. Unlike photographic satellite images, radar images can be measured at night and during days of heavy cloud cover and bad weather. Nevertheless, critics of government incentives argue that radar monitoring has been employed in the past with little success, citing the Global Rain Forest Mapping Project which was instituted in the mid-1990s amid concern over rapid deforestation in the Amazon. However, the limited data of the Mapping Project was due only to the small amount of data that could be sent from the satellite. Modern satellites can send and receive 10 times more data than their predecessors of the mid-1990s, obviating past problems with radar monitoring. Furthermore, recent technological advances in satellite radar that allow for more accurate measurements to be made, even in remote areas, make such technology a promising step in monitoring and controlling global climate change.
Which one of the following most accurately expresses the main point of the passage?
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